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Frequently, after an executor or administrator has gone through the formal process of 
clothing himself ·vviLh a grant of probate or letters of administration, he may find himself 
confronted by some very difficult questions of estate administration. Particularly is this so 
when the question of payment of debts is involved. It ·may be that the estate is insufficient 
to meet the payment of all testator's debts in full and the question arises as to the order in 
which debts should be paid; or it may be that whilst the assets of the estate are ultimately 
adequate to meet all liabilities the latter cannot all be paid from the residuary estate, so that 
the question is posed as to the order in which the various assets of the estate should be resorted 
to and applied to meet the liabilities. Where such assets are given to different beneficiaries 
a very live question will present itself. In some cases these difficult questions may be lifted 
from the shoulders of the personal representative by having the estate administered by the 
Court either in equity or bankruptcy. However, in some cases this is not feasible or perhaps 
not desirable. Moreover the position which will often be placed before a solicitor is that 
existing where the executor has taken certain steps of his own accord, and what has to be 
inquired into is the correctness of what he has done and its effect on the rights of the creditors 
or the rights of the beneficiaries. A solicitor in Queensland, faced with such problems, will in 
most cases have a vague recollection of certain equitable principles applying to the position. 
Turning to the English text books, he will find such principles overlaid with a mass. of legislation 
and he will develop a great doubt as to just how much of this latter is applicable in this State. 
The doubt is abundantly justified. The law of Queensland on the point is difficult to collect, 
complicated in application and shockingly archaic. In many instances things stand much as 
they did in England one hundred years ago. It is thought that it may prove useful to endeavour 
to collect and restate the law of Queensland on the subject. 
As previously hinted there are two topics involved. Firstly, there is the question of 
the priority of debts inter se; assuming that all debts cannot be paid in full, then the inquiry 
will be whether they should all be paid pro rata, and if this is not the case what hierarchy should 
be observed. This question will arise only when the estate is insolvent, using that word in 
the wide sense. If the estate is ultimately able to pay all debts there is no need to approach 
the question of what debts should be paid first save in the case where practical difficulties 
prevent the realisation of some of the assets. The second question is that of the order in 
which the assets should be applied to meet the debts. Theoretically this question will arise 
in almost every administration as it would be a rarity for a testator to die leaving no debts. 
However in the ordinary case the question will be solved in this State by the elementary rule 
that debts are payable out of the ·residuary personal estate left by the deceased. It is only 
when this is not sufficient that the question of resort to other types of property is raised. 
The set of facts necessary to raise the first question will normally exclude the second because 
if the assets of the estate are insufficient to pay debts and if all the assets are legally liable 
to be taken to pay debts, it is ordinarily of little moment to enquire to which type of asset 
prior resort should be made. 
I. Priority of Debts. 
We approach first the topic of the priority of debts inter se. 
The ecclesiastical courts had early taken on themselves the jurisdiction of granting 
probate or letters of administration in regard to personalty, but the actual process of enforcing 
the duties of the personal representative .in regard to the payment of debts was left to the 
common law courts.1 The latter had always allowed creditors to sue the personal representative 
for the debts due from the deceased and obtain judgment de bonis testatoris. Furthermore, 
in what was the more normal case, viz., where the executor did not wait to be sued but proceeded 
voluntarily with the task of payment of debts, they laid down a particular order in which 
l. The ecclesiastical courts had for a while certain machinery to enforce the payment of legacies. 
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creditors should be paid. Real estate, however, to a very large extent stood outside the 
ordinary scheme of things. Real estate descended directly to the heir at law on intestacy 
or, if dealt with by the will, went direct to the devisee. It did not pass to the personal 
representative. Originally, save in a very small area of cases, it was not liable for deceased's 
debts at all. This state of things was gradually changed, but as long as the position existed 
that realty did not go to the personal representative at all, then it appears that, according 
to common law at least, no duties as to the order in which debts should be paid, in the cases 
where the land was liable in respect of such debts, could be laid on the shoulders of the heir 
at law or the devisee unless the estate came to be administered by the Court. They were 
beneficial successors, not representative successors, and it is submitted that if they decided to 
pay debts without waiting to be sued, they could please themselves as to whom they paid.2 
This state of things still exists to some extent in regard to the devisee of real estate 
in Queensland. 
The common law rules regarding both process against the executor, qua his representative 
position, for recovery of the debt and process against the executor personally in the event of 
his disregarding the rights of creditors by failing to observe the rules of priority or otherwise 
committing the wrong known as devastavit, were both harsh and antiquated.3 The direct 
action against the executor to compel payment (the action de bonis testatoris) was moreover 
in many cases ineffectual because many types of property could not be reached by legal 
process. As has been mentioned, testator's realty was in most cases quite immune. The 
greatest vice, however, attaching to both types of procedure was the fact that everything 
depended upon lndividual action taken by the creditor. The creditor could by taking action 
against the executor and immediately levying execution against his personalty under the 
judgment, recover payment in full of his debt even though the estate was in a parlous financial 
condition and the result of the creditor's action was to leave other creditors totally unpaid. 
Then acts of the executor in neglect of his duties, for instance distributing the estate before 
debts were paid or paying debts in thei:t: wrong order, merely exposed the executor to an action 
for damages for devastavit which was in the nature of an action for tort. Thus although common 
law had a system of rules regulating priorities, its ultimate enforcement depended only on action 
brought by an aggrieved creditor after the harm had been done. There was no system of 
court administration by which all claimants could be brought before the court so that all 
claims could be satisfied in a fair and equitable manner as far as the assets extended, and by 
which a system of payment of debts in due priority could be directly enjoined by the court. 
Of the common law courts Professor Hanbury has said: "From them might be obtained 
vigorous action at the suit of one creditor, not watchful superintendence over the rights of all."4 
The whole picture was changed by the invasion of the field by the Court of Chancery. 
It is well known that one of the most potent weapons forged by that Court was the 
administration suit. Under this procedure, the Court itself assumed control of the assets of 
the deceased, brought all the creditors before it and either it or the executor acting under its 
control and direction attended to the payment of creditors in due priority and the ultimate 
distribution to beneficiaries. The estate was "thrown into Chancery." The Court looked 
into everything. If the executor before the order for administration was made had committed 
acts of devastavit, then that could be taken care of by the Court and appropriate orders be 
made. The order for administration by the Court could be asked for by a creditor, a beneficiary, 
or the executor himself, and was granted as of course once the locus standi of the applicant 
was proved. Much more was settled than questions of debt payment; the Court concerned 
itself with the whole process of administration, including not only the enforcement of the 
rights of creditors, but also the ascertainment of the financial position of the estate by the 
taking of the accounts, the ascertainment of classes of beneficiaries, the determination of the 
rights of beneficiaries and the decisio11 of disputed questions of will interpretation. The 
jurisdiction in Queensland is part of the equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The 
2. More will be said of this submission later. 
3. Even now the rules surrounding the action against the executor in his representative capacity are needlessly 
fettered with technicalities-see Halsbury Laws of England 2nd Ed. Vol. 14 pp. 436-8. 
4. Hanbury: Modern Equity 6th Ed. p. 491. 
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whole· procedure became extremely dilatory in England in the early nineteenth century and 
its delays were satirised by such novelists as Dickens. Its fundamental defect was that the 
Court could not deal with any one point without decreeing general administration of the estate 
and this meant that even a very small point could not be decided without throwing the whole 
estate into Chancery and going through the whole complicated and costly procedure of taking 
the accounts, directing inquiries and reports, and so on. A further defect was the existence 
of an unduly hberal right of appeal. Reforms in the nineteenth century made it possible to 
decide matters without a general decree of Court administration. The short cuts now possible 
can be seen from a study of our Supreme Court Rules5, but it is necessary to recall that these 
shortened procedures are essentially derivatives from the old Chancery administrative process. 
Nowadays it is also possible to have the estate wound up in the bankruptcy jurisdiCtion,6 and 
partly owing to this and partly owing to the various short cuts provided, it is rare to have in 
Queensland a full-dress order for the administration of the estate in equity.7 
One of the advantages of the Chancery procedure was that certain of the deceased's 
assets which were by common law rules beyond the reach of creditors, were now made available. 
It is now necessary, however, to turn to the question of the actual availability of assets to 
pay testator's debts. 
The process by which all the assets of a deceased person were ultimately made available 
to pay his debts is a complicated one, and one which it is necessary to trace because it brings 
to the fore that dark and mysterious distinction between legal and equitable assets which 
determined the actual rules of priority and still in Queensland regulates those archaic but 
long-enduring rights known as the rights of retainer and preference. 
We start with the fact that common law regarded as liable for the debts of the deceased 
all the property of the deceased which vested in the executor (or administrator) virtute officii, 
that is to say by virtue of his position, automatically and without any specific mention in the 
will, for instance almost all personalty whether disposed of by the will or devolving on intestacy. 
These types of property were called "legal assets." Such assets are those which are recoverable 
by the executor merely by virtue of his appointment as executor. 8 The phrase "legal assets" 
did not refer to the nature of the property but the manner in which it devolved. 9 Thus, as 
Maitland points out, an equitable interest in a term of years held by a trustee is legal assets 
because on the death of the person for whom it is held in trust, the equitable interest of that 
person automatically goes to the executor.l0 It is sometimes deduced from the remarks of 
Kindersley V. C. in Cook v. Gregson11 that the distinction is that legal assets are those which 
may be recovered in a court of law, equitable assets those which are recoverable in equity 
only.l2 Yet, 'as his succeeding remarks show, this is but a secondary distinction and one 
which is not quite correct as, literally interpreted, it would make land going to the heir at 
law legal assets in the cases where the latter could be sued at law for the debts of the deceased. 
·
Realty was necessarily excluded from the scope of legal assets because at the time that 
the concept was evolved realty passed to the heir at law if undisposed of and direct to the 
devisee if disposed of by will. It did not vest in a personal representative as such at all. 
Moreover only in a small minority of cases could it be rendered liable for the debts of deceased. 
Some writers do refer to land which is liable in the hands of the heir as "legal real assets," 
but none go to the length of asserting that as regards creditors it was subject to the same 
strict rules regarding priority of debts as are legal assets in the strict sense. 
5. See Rules of the Supreme Court 0. IV. RR. 12, 14, 16. 
6. See Bankruptcy Act (C/w) s. 155. 
7. An instance was Re Clendinnen, Zacka v. Wilson No. 168 of 1911 (unreported). 
8. See Williams: Real Assets p. 7. 
9. See for the nature of the distinction O'Grady v . .Wilmot [19161 2 A.C. 231, Cook v. Gregson 3 Drew 547, 
61 E.R. 1012. 
10. See Maitland: Equity 2nd Ed. p. 255. 
11. Supra. 
12. See Robbins & Maw: Devolution of Real Estate 4th Ed. p. 144. 
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As against the concept of legal assets stands that of equitable assets. Equitable-assets 
were those which did not vest in the executor virtute officii but nevertheless came to be made 
available for creditors through the process of the Chancery action for the administration of 
the estate. Chancery was able to make these available whenever it appeared that in some 
way a trust or duty to pay debts had been imposed by the testator on the property. Through 
this concept it was able to break down to some extent the rule that land was sacrosanct. If 
the testator had devised his land charged with the payment of his debts or had devised his 
land upon trust to pay debts, then equity regarded it as sufficiently impressed with a fiduciary 
obligation to enable the Court to make it available. It became equitable assets .. Equity 
also made one extension in. the field of personalty. Most personalty was legal assets and 
within the reach of a common law judgment. This, however, did not apply to the position 
where the testator did not have the ownership of the property but had a power of appointment 
over it. Common law could not touch this property but Chancery regarded it as equitable 
assets provided that the power of appointment was a general one and had been exercised by 
the testator by his will. 
Equitable assets could be made available only in the course of a Chancery administration 
action. They were not liable in the eye of common law. Nor would equity allow an individual 
suit by one creditor for recovery. It should be remarked that equitable assets do not consist 
of everything that does not go to the executor virtute officii. The phrase covers such of such 
assets as historically have been liable in the hands of the personal representative in a Chancery 
administration action. 
We must now return, to realty. The equitable extensions we have noted did not touch 
the ordinary case of land descending on intestacy to the heir at law or devised by an ordinary 
devise which imposed no charge or trust. Such land, it is submitted, was not legal assets; 
nor was it equitable assets. It was originally in the main free from any liability for deceased's 
debts. However, common law had always allowed one small exception. If the debt had 
been contracted by the deceased by an instrument under seal by which the deceased had 
contracted for himself and his heirs then the heir at law could be sued. Such land was known 
as "assets by descent." It should be noted that the creditor had to be more than a specialty 
creditor; it was necessary that he claim under a specialty document in which the heir of the 
obligor was named. Even then the liability did not originally affect the devisee, so that the 
position was that a man could cheat his creditors, even in this special case, by disposing of ' 
his land by will. By the Statute of Fraudulent Devises in 1691 some steps were taken to make 
the devisee liable and by an Act of 1830 in England the devisee was made in effect as fully 
liable as the heir. This legislation was copied in Queensland in sections 75-85 of the Succession 
Act 1867. It must be remembered it is limited to the class of creditors holding specialties in 
which the heir is named. 
Ordinary specialty creditors and a fortiori simple contract creditors had by law as 
distinct from equity no right of recourse against land at all. Even in equity they had no 
rights unless the land was "equitable assets." In this respect the law has of course been 
subsequently changed both in England and Queensland but the respective lines of development 
are widely divergent. It is thought that in England Lord Romilly's Act of 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 
IV. c. 104) had the effect of making land equitable assets no matter what the type of debt, 
whilst possibly the Land Transfer Act 1897 by making land vest in all· cases initially in the 
executor or administrator later re-converted it into legal assets. The point is now quite 
academic in England. In Queensland, however, land was not brought under either category. 
In 1813 the Imperial legislature passed the New South Wales (Debts) Act (54 Geo. III 
c. 15) which made provision inter alia that real estates in New South Wales should be assets 
for the payment of all debts in the same way as real estates were at that time liable in England 
for the payment of bond or other specialty debts. This statute is part of the law of Queensland. 
At first glance this statute would not appear to have accomplished anything of significance 
inasmuch as realty in England in 1813 was not liable for the payment of all "bond or other 
specialty" debts. It was liable only where the specialty was of a particular narrowly defined 
I 
� 
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type. However in Bullen v. A'Beckett13 it was accepted that this enactment made real estate 
liable for all debts, though it was held that it did not have the effect of making realty vest in 
the executor or personal representative. The result is that realty still did not become legal 
assets. It is also thought that this enactment did not, as (semble) did Romilly's Act of 1833 
in England, have the effect of making ordinary realty equitable assets. Firstly, the language 
of the Act of 1813 is strikingly dissimilar from that of the English Act of 1833; the English 
Act makes the land "assets to be administered in Courts of Equity." Secondly, realty was 
made liable only in the same way in which in 1813 it was made liable for bond or specialty, 
that is by ordinary common law writ or bill in equity14 against the heir or devisee personally. 
It is clear that under the English Act no direct personal liability on the part of the heir or 
devisee enforceable in an ordinary action was created; the assets could be reached in an 
administration action and in an administration action only. Thirdly, if all realty was made 
equitable assets, then the provisions of section 82 of the Succession Act 1867 (to be hereafter 
mentioned) making a trader's realty equitable assets would be unnecessary. It seems clear 
that ordinary realty became neither legal nor equitable assets; to what extent a Court of 
equitable jurisdiction could deal with it at all in the ordinary way of an administration action 
was doubtful. It is beyond doubt, however, that the Act made the heir at law liable to be 
sued by the ordinary simple contract creditor, a position which never existed in England .. 
So far as land in the hands of a devisee was concerned, it seems clear that the ordinary creditor 
could not avail himself of the provisions of ss. 75-85 of the Succession Act. What was imported 
was the liability of the devisee as it existed in regard to bond creditors in 1813. However 
this would include the provisions of the Statute of Fraudulent Devises of 1691. 
We now have to notice certain legislative changes which occurred after the separation 
of Queensland. 
Section 82 of the Succession Act 1867 made all the realty of a _deceased "trader", (this 
word being interpreted in the light of the then existing insolvency laws), equitable assets to 
pay all debts, subject, however, owing to a perverse twist of the legislative mind, to a priority, 
which was abolished by Hinde Palmer's Act in 1871, in favour of creditors holding specialties 
in which the heir was bound. 
Section 70 of the same Act provides that where real estate is charged with debts but 
has not been devised to any trustee, the executor shall have a power of sale for the purpose of 
paying the debts. This section therefore deals with a well-known type of equitable asset, but 
has the somewhat unique effect of allowing the executor to get possession of such asset even 
though the legal title thereto is not vested in him and that without an application to the Court. 
The most important statutory change in this field, however, was that made in 1877 
when the Queensland legislature, anticipating later and similar activity in England, provided 
that land on intestacy should vest in the administrator.15 The administrator unlike the heir 
is a representative successor to the deceased. Though there is nothing in the statute purporting 
to place the administrator in the same position regarding liability for debts as the heir at law, 
it was held in R. v. Bourne, Ex parte Spresser16 that the administrator is now liable to creditors 
to the same extent as was the heir at law. No reasons were given by the Court for this decision; 
however, there are a number of decisions in New South Wales in which the position of the 
administrator was held to be equated to that of the heir in other matters17 and the proposition 
that the administrator is liable seems to be beyond doubt. 
It seems that since the Act of 1877 we must regard realty undisposed of, even when the 
deceased was a trader, as technically legal assets. It now vests in the personal representative 
virtute officii. For reasons to be later mentioned, however, it does not seem that the question 
is of much importance. 
13. l Moo. P.C. 223, 15 E.R. 684. 
14. Equity followed the law in allowing a personal action for recovery against the heir at law where such 
land constituted "assets by descent." 
15. Intestacy Act 1877 s. 12. 
16. 8 Q.L.J. 14. 
17. See Re Crane 8 S.R. (N.S.W.) 132 and Ex parte Price 61 W.N. (N.S.W.) 264. 
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A fair summary of the Queensland position to-day appears to be that all personal estate 
is legal assets save personalty passing under a power of appointment, which is an equitable 
asset, and that as regards realty the position is that realty undisposed of is a legal asset, that 
realty charged by the will with the payment of debts or devised in trust to pay debts and 
realty disposed of by the will of a trader are equitable assets and that other types of realty 
are neither legal nor equitable assets though now liable for the payment of, debts. 
An endeavour has been made to characterise assets as legal, equitable, or neither, 
because with this classification the order of priority of debts is very closely linked. 
We turn now to the actual rules of priority. 
The first essential fact to notice is that out of legal assets the common law required the 
executor. to pay the debts in a particular order of priority. This order was very technical. 
Stripped of some of its details it amounted to this. Funeral and testamentary expenses came 
first but subject to this the debts were arrayed in seven classes. Firstly came debts due to 
the Crown by record or specialty, secondly debts given priority by special statute, thirdly 
judgment debts due by the deceased, fourthly recognizance debts and debts given the status 
of statutes staple and statutes merchant under certain old and now obsolete legislation, fifthly 
specialty debts, sixthly simple contract debts due to the Crown, and lastly debts due on simple 
contract (other than Crown debts). Where the creditor had recovered judgment against the 
executor the debt stood in many respects in a separate class. The creditor was entitled to 
priority over debts of equal degree with that upon which he obtained judgment, but not over 
debts standing in higher degree. Thus for instance a creditor who had obtained judgment 
upon a simple contract debt would be entitled to priority over other simple contract creditors 
who had not obtained judgment but not over a specialty creditor, even though the latter had 
not obtained judgment. 
In the event of assets being insufficient to pay debts, then, subject to the executor's 
right of retainer and right to prefer creditors (see post), among each class the claims abated 
proportionately but the whoTe of the creditors in one class had to be paid in full before any 
of the next (lower) class could be paid at all. ·Neglect of this requirement, provided that he 
had notice of the existence of a debt of the higher class, made the executor liable for a devastavit. 
If he neglected a bond creditor, 'for instance, and paid simple contract creditors so that no 
assets were left to pay the bond creditor, he had to pay the latter out of his own pocket. 
Common law, however, could have nothing to say to equitable assets, and when these 
were dealt with by the Court of Chancery in an administration action the above ,order was 
neglected. Chancery insisted that Crown debts must be paid first but all other debts were 
paid proportionately out of such assets without regard to the character of the debt. It seems, 
however, that debts due under voluntary covenant or bond were paid after all other debts 
unless they had been assigned for value in the lifetime of the deceased. It should of course 
be remembered that, no matter what the type of administration, funeral and testamentary 
expenses are payable in priority to all debts, even debts due to the Crown.18 
There were two other important "priority" distinctions between legal and equitable 
assets. The first one concerns the right of preference. As between debts in the same class 
and out of legal aosets, the executor had a right to prefer any one creditor, that is a right to 
pay him in full even if thereby the other creditors got nothing or greatly lessened amounts. 
The right, however, could not be exercised against creditors in a higher degree, for instance 
a simple contract creditor could not be "preferred" as against a specialty creditor. Moreover, 
it follows from what has been said previously that the right could not be exercised against a 
creditor who had actually obtained J'udgment against the executor unless the debt sought to 
be preferred was one of a higher rank. The second one concerns the right of retainer. This 
was the right of an executor who was also a creditor to pay himself in full .out of legal assets 
18. R. v. Wade 5 Price at 627, 146 E.R. at 715. 
·' 
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before other creditors in the same degree were paid. It followed logically from the right of 
preference, as if an executor could pay any creditor why could he not pay himself ? Moreover, 
as he could not sue himself and as he had to pay all creditors who sued him, then he would 
necessarily lose his debt unless he was given some such right.l9 Once again the right existed 
only as against debts standing in the same class of priority. However, it could be exercised 
even if the debt was statute barred by virtue of the Statutes of Limitations.20 It could not 
be exercised, huwever, where the debt was void or unenforceable for some other reason, for 
instance by reason of the Statute of Frauds.21 
Both preference and retainer were rights exercisable only out of legal ·assets: They 
were not exercisable at all out of equitable assets. 
Now common law had no method whereby all creditors could be brought to the one 
forum for their claims to be adjusted in one comprehensive proceeding. If one creditor of an 
in fact insolvent estate showed signs of exhausting that estate by proceeding to judgment 
and execution, the common law courts could do nothing to protect the general body of creditors. 
Nor could they, when the executor was proceeding to pay debts voluntarily, directly prevent 
him from violating the proper order of priority. It follows that the only way in which the 
legal order of priority of debts could be protected by a court of common law was to punish 
the executor who paid the debts in the wrong order of priority or who exercised invalidly the 
right of preference or retainer. This it did by holding him liable in an action for a devastavit. 
But the Court of Chancery used the administration action wherein the Court applied the priority 
rules as part of its own administrative process and it brought all creditors before it. If the 
assets it was administering were equitable assets, then it used its own order of priority and 
it did not allow the rights of retainer and preference. However, it might be administering 
legal assets. There was nothing to prevent these being administered by the Cour:t of 
Chancery; frequently it administered an estate where all the assets were legal assets. In 
fact very often the circumstances that led to the estate being thrown into Chancery were 
that a creditor had commenced proceedings for administration by the Court because another 
creditor was threatening to strip the estate by suing in the common law courts. For the 
Chancery had a power to restrain such a creditor when an action had been commenced for 
administration. The point, however, is that "equity followed the law." Out of legal assets 
it paid debts in the legal order of priority. Moreover, out of legal assets it allowed the right 
of retainer even after decree for administration of the estate had been made22 though the 
right came to an end if there was a receiver appointed in the action. As regards preference, 
this right, however, came to an end the moment the decree for administration was made but 
prior acts done in exercise of the right were not affected. Moreover the mere commencement 
of the proceedings for administration by issue of writ or originating summons did not prevent 
the exercise of the right of preference. 23 
The position in Queensland therefore at, say, the 
'
date of separation from New South 
\i\Tales was that the Court in ordinary common law jurisdiction dealt only with legal assets 
and applied the common law order of priority of debts and allowed the executor to retain 
and prefer. It dealt only with individual proceedings by creditor against debtor and had no 
general administrative court process. The Supreme Court on its equitable side, the descendant 
of the Court. of Chancery, in the course of administering an estate applied its own order of 
priority as regards equitable assets and did not allow the two rights of retainer and preference, 
but as regards legal assets applied the legal rules subject to the abovementioned limit as to 
the right of preference. As regards distribution out of Court, the executor was certainly bound 
by the legal order as to priority out of legal assets and could exercise the rights of retainer 
and preference, controlled only by the necessity to see that the legal hierarchy was respected. 
In fact the breach of his duty in paying debts out of their due order or improperly exercising 
the rights of preference or retainer was the only way in which the priorities rules could be 
19. See Re Compton (1885) 30 Ch. D. 15, 19. 
20. Stahlschmidt v. Lett 1 Sm. & G. 415, 65 E.R. 182. 
21. Re Rownson (1885) 29 Ch. D. 358. 
22. Campbell v. Campbell (1880) 16 Ch. D. 198. 
23. Re Radcliffe (1878) 7 Ch. D. 733. 
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applied by the common law Courts as the injured creditor could in such case sue for a devastavit. 
As regards equitable assets, the question arises whether the executor was out of Court bound 
to apply the equitable order. Frequently the question would not arise, as the only way in 
which he or a creditor could get access to many equitable assets would be by commencing 
an action for the administration of the estate. Sometimes, however, he could lay his hands 
on them, for instance by sale under Section 70 of the Succession Act 1867. If he had them 
under his control it seems that he would have to observe the equitable rules of priority just 
as if the estate was being administered by the Court. 
The position as regards that type of realty which was neither legal nor equitable assets 
is most obscure. In Queensland this class originally comprised realty descending to the heir 
at law and realty devised without a charge or trust for debts. It has now shrunk to the latter 
type. It is clear that such realty is not legal assets and never has been so regarded. If 
previous submissions are correct it is not equitable assets. In the nature of the case it is 
difficult to see how any rules of priority could be evolved. The devisee (and in the old days 
the heir at law) was not an executor, administrator or trustee of any sort. Though sometimes 
called a "real" representative, he in fact was a beneficial successor and was no more bound 
to observe rules of priority or even to observe a rule of pari passu distribution than would 
be an individual who had contracted debts and who had not been made bankrupt. With 
creditors it would seem to be a case of "first come, first served." In view of the fact that in 
England before 1833 real estate was not liable in respect of ordinary debts and that Romilly's 
Act in 1833 then made all realty equitable assets, there was never any situation in that country 
comparable to that created by the Act of 1813 in Australia. Comparison can be only with 
the pre-1833 situation relating to assets by descent in England. It seems clear that in the 
cases where common law, as supplemented by the Ac� 3 W. & M. c. 14, made the heir or devisee 
liable to an action, so too would equity render him liable to be sued by bill in Chancery.24 
This, however, contemplated merely individual action by creditor against debtor. There 
have been instances where the Court of Chancery has been asked to administer real estate in 
cases where there were bond debts in which the heir was bound,25 but there does not seem 
to be any instance where the Court actually put in train a process of administration of the 
realty for the benefit of all bond creditors based on definite rules as to the quantum which 
each was to receive and the priority between them. It may of course be said that all the 
creditors in such cases would be in the same degree so that no priority question would arise 
but the answer to this is twofold. Firstly, if there was any system of "debt priority" 
,adjudication by the Court or any rules to be observed by the heir, a preference would be 
accorded to bond debts due to the Crown. Secondly, even a rule that all creditors were 
entitled to pro rata treatment would imply at least some regulation of the matter by the Court 
or by the law as the case may be. 
It is submitted that as the heir at law and devisee are beneficial successors and not 
subject to any trust in favour of creditors, they were not when acting out of Court subject to 
any duties as regards the mode in which they paid creditors. 26 It is inconceivable that any 
action in the nature of a devastavit would lie against the heir at law or devisee. Bearing 
superficially against the contention that equity neither recognised nor enforced any rule of 
priority binding the heir as regards debts payable out of real estate, is the fact that there are 
certain decisions that the heir at law is permitted to "retain" for a debt due to him. 27 
Formulation of such a right, it might be argued, would surely be unnecessary if there were 
not some existing duties as to the order of payment of debts binding the heir and some 
hierarchy of debts. However, all that these decisions seem to involve is that if the heir has 
paid a debt due to himself out of the realty and thereby has not sufficient means to pay the 
plaintiff, who is a particular creditor suing, he is enabled to plead that he has no assets by 
descent. Otherwise injustice would be done to the heir by reason of the fact that he cannot 
24. Gawler v. Wade (1707) 1 P. Wms. 99; 24 E.R. 312. 
25. e.g. Player v. Foxhall 1 Russ. 538, 38 E.R. 207. 
26. See Robbins & Maw: Devolution of Real Estate 4th Ed. p. 7. 
27. Loomes v. Stotherd 1 Sim. & St. 458, 57 E.R. 183 and see Shetelworth v. Neville 1 T.R. 454, 99 E.R. 1194. 
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sue himself. This last is in fact the basis of the rule as it applies in favour of an executor 
and the question of priority only emerges as the result of the formulation of some limit on 
the power to retain. 
On the other hand, it seems that the Court of Chancery would entertain an action for 
the administration of assets by descent28 and in fact enforced some rules regarding such 
administration fr;r instance the rule that the devisee was entitled to insist that debts be paid 
out of the land going to the heir before the devised land was resorted to.29 Case law does 
indeed suggest that the Chancery gave assistance only to individual action taken by one 
creditor by allowing a suit in equity for recovery analogous to the action at law. This, 
however, is not conclusive as this was the original attitude of equity towards claims of creditors 
against the executors where personalty was concerned. 30 It appears reasonable to assume 
that where the Chancery was asked to administer assets by descent, it in the course of its own 
administration, enforced a rule that creditors should be paid pari passu subject probably to 
a rule of priority where the Crown was concerned. A statement by Ashburner supports this 
conclusion.31 Some rule had to be followed; there could not be a vacuum. 
It is submitted that the like considerations should apply to the position created by 
the Act of 1813 when it threw open all realty to the claims of all creditors. 
We return to the general position and look at the changes made by legislation since 
the separation of Queensland from New South Wales. 
In 1871 the Specialty and Simple Contract Debts Equalisation Act, adopting the English 
statute usually known as Hinde Palmer's Act, provided that in the administration of the estate 
of a deceased person no debt should be entitled to priority by reason merely that the same 
is secured by or arises under an instrument under seal or is otherwise made or constituted a 
specialty debt but that all the creditors of such person as well specialty as simple contract 
should be treated as standing in equal degree and be paid accordingly out of the assets of 
such deceased person whether such assets are legal or equitable. This statute then removed 
one of the most important priority distinctions appertaining to legal assets but it did not 
remove the rule of priority of Crown debts nor was it interpreted as interfering with priorities 
other than the priority of specialty debts, for instance the rule of priority of judgment debts. 
In 1877, as already noticed, the Intestacy Act 1877 had presumably the effect of making 
land on intestacy legal assets. It was held, however, in England in Re Williams32 that the 
Land Transfer Act 1897 did not by vesting the real estate of a deceased person in his personal 
representative give a right of retainer to such personal representative out of such realty. The 
decision does depend upon a proviso in the English section that "nothing herein contained 
shall alter or affect the order in which real and personal assets respectively are now applicable 
in or towards the payment of ... debts." This provision does not appear in the Queensland 
Act. Nevertheless, apart from this, it appears that the Court thought that the intention of 
the Act was not to extend the right of retainer, "a relic of old law not founded on justice and 
working the greatest possible injustice,"33 to a type of assets to which it previously had no 
application. It is suggested that the decision would be followed in this State. 
A revolutionary change in reg9-rd to the position where the estate is being administered 
by the Supreme Court in equity was mad,e by section 5 (1) of the judicature Act 1876 which 
provided that in the administration by the Court of the assets of any person whose estate might 
prove to be insufficient for the payment in full of his debts, the same rules should prevail as 
to the respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors and as to the debts and liabilities 
proveable and as to the valuation of annuities and future or contingent liabilities as might 
be in force for the time being under the law of insolvency with respect to the estates of persons 
28. See Player v. Foxhall, supra. 
29. See post. 
30. Ashburner: Principles of Equity 2rid Ed. p. 410. 
31. Ashburner: op cit p. 409. 
32. [1904] I Ch. 52. 
33. per Malins V. C. in Crowder v. Stewart 16 Ch. D. at 369. 
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adjudged insolvent. For a time it was thought that the effect of this enactment was merely 
to introduce the bankruptcy rules regarding the matters set out and that the only practical 
effect was to supersede the old Chancery rule of Mason v. Bogg34• However, a series of 
decisions in England culminating in Re Whitaker35 proceeded on the basis that the bankruptcy 
rules as to priority of debts were introduced. So far as Queensland is concerned, this is 
confirmed by the decision in Re Moat.36 The effect is to bring in the bankruptcy priorities 
as set out in Section 84 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. It is not intended to quote these in 
detail but it should be noted that there are no priorities in favour of the Crown as such or 
judgment creditors. Priority is accorded in the following order, viz., administration costs, 
funeral and testamentary expenses, wages or salary of a clerk or workman with certain limits, 
payments due in respect of workmens' compensation up to a certain amount, moneys paid 
under articles of apprenticeship, rates, land and income tax and, lastly, rent due to the landlord 
up to a certain amount. In most cases the debts made preferential are made so only with a 
limitation as to amount or some other qualification. In one important respect the rules in 
an equity administration in the Supreme Court appear to differ from those applicable in 
bankruptcy. There is a fundamental rule that the Crown's prerogative privileges are not to 
be held to have been taken away by statute unless the Act binds the Crown either expressly 
or by necessary implication. The order of priority set out in the Bankruptcy Act effectively 
excludes the priority of Crown debts in a winding up under the Act because the Act is expressed 
to bind the Crown.37 However the judicature Act clearly does not bind the Crown and as 
it merely incorporates the bankruptcy rules by reference, it seems that Crown debts still 
preserve their ancient priority38 though they would rank after funeral and testamentary 
expenses which are not regarded as debts in the strict sense. Another difference is that the 
old rule that if one of several creditors in equal degree obtains a judgment against the executor, 
such creditor must be satisfied before others in the same class and the right of preference cannot 
be exercised against him, appears to have survived the Judicature Act.39 
The judicature Act, however, does not import those bankruptcy rules which go merely 
to swell the assets to be administered by treating property vested in another person as still 
notionally part of the bankrupt's estate, for instance the rules as to reputed ownership, the 
avoidance of voluntary settlements, and the avoidance of preferences.40 
As a result of the judicature Act the old common law and equitable rules as to priorities, 
in so far as an equity administration by the Court is concerned, are dead, save as to Crown 
priorities and save as to the special rule in favour of a creditor who has obtained judgment 
against the executor. However the rights of retainer and preference are unaffected,41 that 
is to say retainer and preference may be exercised out of legal assets with the limitation as to 
preference previ.ously noticed. The distinction between legal and equita,ble assets still th"erefore 
remains a live one. Moreover the bankruptcy order of priority does not apply , to an 
administration conducted by the executor out of Court; here the old rules of priority as 
modified by Hinde Palmer's Act still live on. 
Lastly in chronological sequence comes section 155 of the Commonwealth Bankruptcy 
Act. Under this the estate of a deceased person may be administered by the Bankruptcy 
Court itself. A petition may be presented to the Court by any creditor whose debt would 
have been sufficient as a petitioning creditor's debt had the debtor been alive. There is no 
need to prove an act of bankruptcy. The Court may make an order for administration unless 
-------
------------------------------------------------------------
34. (1837) 2 My. & Cr. 443; 40 E.R. 709. Under this rule a secured creditor who had endeavoured to enforce 
his security and had thereby secured partial payment could still claim in the Court administration on 
the basis of the full amount of his debt. 
35. [1901] I Ch. 9. 
36. (1897) 8 Q.L.J. 42. 
37. BanMuptcy Acts. 5 (3). 
38. See Re Oriental Bank Corporation 28 Ch. D. 643, 649. 
39. See Williams: Executors and Administrators lOth Ed. p. 783. This proposition appears to follow from 
such cases as Re Radcliffe 7 Ch. D. 733 and Vibart v. Coles 24 Q.E.D. 364. 
40. Gorringe v. Irwell India-Rubber Works (1886) 34 Ch. D. 128; Re Gould (1887) 19 Q.E.D. 92; Re Maggi 
(1882) 20 Ch. D. at 550. 
41. Lee v, Nuttall 12 Ch. D. 61. 
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satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that the estate will be sufficient for the payment 
of deceased's debts. A petition may not be presented after proceedings have been commenced 
in the Supreme Court in equity for administration but the latter Court may transfer the 
proceedings to the Court exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction. Under section 156 the executor 
or administrator himself may present a petition and here there is no necessity for the existence 
of a sufficient petitioning creditor's debt. What is administered by the Court is the "deceased 
debtor's estate" and "the property of the debtor", so that it would appear that realty devised 
without a charge or trust for debts would nevertheless be subject to the Court's control and 
would be governed by the rules of priority set out in section 84. 
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with antecedent transactions, for instance 
preferences, executions and volunt.ary settlements, apply,42 but, whilst it has been held that 
section 91 applies in ascertaining what assets are covered by the words "property of the 
debtor,"43 it is thought that in view of the absence of any necessity for an act of bankruptcy, 
section 90 governing relation back would be inapplicable. 
In actual administration, the bankruptcy rules of priority set out in section 84 have 
full and untrammelled operation so that there is no priority attaching to Crown debts. One 
would expect that the distinction between legal and equitable assets would be mere dead 
wood in this context, but it was held in Re Rhoades44 that the executor's right of retainer existed 
even if exercised after date of administration order. There seems no reason to doubt that 
this decision would be followed in Australia. If retainer exi�ts there is no reason why 
preference should not, though semble it would be limited to the period before administration 
order. The provisions of section 94 of the Act dealing with "preferences" would invalidate 
only transactions having the effect of preferring creditors which were entered into by the 
debtor while living. Clearly the language of section 94 would not touch acts performed by the 
personal representative. Retainer and preference would, however, extend only to legal assets. 
We must now attempt a summary. 
It will first be assumed that the estate being administered comprises only assets which 
can be described as either legal or equitable. In such cases funeral and testamentary expenses 
always come first, save in an administration by the Court of Bankruptcy under section 155 of 
the Federal Act, in which case they rank second to costs of bankruptcy administration. The 
position of other debts will vary according to the way in which the estate is being administered. 
Firstly, it may be administered by the personal representative out of Court. In this 
case the old rules of priority are still alive. Out of legal assets the old strict rules of priority 
must be observed as to debts of which the representative has notice with the exception that 
by virtue of Hinde Palmer's Act and save as to Crown debts, specialty creditors rank equally 
with simple contract creditors. Again out of legal assets the rights of retainer and preference 
are exercisable to their fullest extent though only as between debts in the same hierarchical 
class. The only exception is that, although land which is undisposed of and so descends to 
the administrator is now, semble, legal assets, yet it is not subject to the rights of retainer or 
preference. Equitable assets as such would often not come into the hands of the personal 
representative, but in the circumstances where they did the representative would be bound to 
distribute equally save for the priority accorded to 'crown debts and would have no rights of 
retainer or preference. 
Secondly, the estate might be administered by the Supreme Court in equity. Here 
the order in relation to both legal and equitable assets would be that contained in the Bankruptcy 
Act save that debts due to the Crown would constitute the highest class of priority after funeral 
and testamentary expenses. The rights of preference and retainer would be exercisable by 
the representative out of legal assets save realty descending on intestacy. Whereas however 
42. Bankruptcy Acts. 155 (4A). This provision is stronger than the English one and would probably exclude 
the principle of the decision in Re Gould (supra) so far as itapplies to administration in bankruptcy. 
43. Lloyd v. Public Trustee of N.S. W. (1930) 44 C.L.R. 312. 
44. [1899] 2 Q.B. 347. 
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the right of retainer would be exercisable even after the order for administration had been 
made, acts of preference remain valid only in so far as exercised before such order. 
Lastly, the estate might be administered by the Bankruptcy Court. Here the bankruptcy 
rules of .priority would be applied in their entirety so that the Crown would have no priority. 
The rights of retainer and preference, however, remain exercisable out of legal assets to the 
same extent as in an equity administration. 
We must now mention the case of assets which are neither legal nor equitable. The 
only remaining case in Queensland seems to be that of realty devised without the creation 
of a charge or trust for debts. In this case the assets would clearly be brought within the 
scope of a Court administration under the Bankruptcy Act, and in this case the bankruptcy 
order of priorities would apply. If prior submissions are correct, such assets could also be 
administered in a Court of Equity, but the old rule that apparently applied of payment pari 
passu would now be affected by the Judicature Act with the result that the bankruptcy rules 
of priority would be imported save as to Crown debts. In cases where no procedure of general 
Court administration had been initiated, it is merely a matter of the creditor suing the devisee. 
If the latter has not waited for litigation but has paid debts voluntarily, then he commits no 
breach of duty in paying them in whatever order he pleases. In the nature of the case any 
action of the devisee in paying a particular creditor or retaining funds to meet a debt due to 
himself would have to be respected even if the estate was later wound up by the Court. A 
case such as Re Illidge45 would not be applicable in Queensland as it depends on the fact that 
in England a simple contract creditor could never bring an ordinary personal action against 
the heir or devisee. 
One last word regarding the rights of preference and retainer. It was seen that these 
rights cannot be exercised to the detriment of a creditor in a higher degree in the hierarchy 
of priority. The question arises to what hierarchical order should reference now be made in 
determining the limits of these rights. In the days before the Judicature Act the order 
applicable was that established by the common law as modified by Hinde Palmer's Act. There 
are indications that the Courts were somewhat slow in recognising the implications of the 
latter Act. Thus in Wilson v. Coxwell46 we find it being decided that the executor has no 
right to prefer a simple contract creditor as against a specialty creditor. This was a decision 
of a single judge and in view of a contrary decision on the right of preference by the Court of 
Appeal47 and the decision in Re Harris48, in addition to the obvious inaccuracy of the decision 
in point of principle, it seems that it would now be overruled. 
Since the importation of the bankruptcy priorities in an equity administration by the 
Judicature Act, it is obvious that the classes of creditors against whom retainer may or may 
not be exercised must be determined in some circumstances by reference to the bankruptcy 
order. Thus in A.-G. v. Jackson49 it was held, overruling Re Ambler,50 that the executor 
could not retain a debt due to him as against a claim made preferential by the Bankruptcy Act. 
It is suggested, however, that such a principle can apply only when the executor is seeking 
to enforce his right after an order for Court administration is made. At any time prior to 
this the actual order of priority in which debts should be paid is the common law order as 
modified by Hinde Palmer's Act and it seems that the limits of the rights of retainer and 
preference should be determined by reference to that order. The bankruptcy order should 
be relevant only when the estate is in process of being administered by the Court. As the 
right of preference cannot be exercised at all after decree for administration, it would follow 
that where this right is sought to be exercised it is available within the limits of the common 
law hierarchy. An alternative submission that prior to decree the rights whether of retainer 
or preference cannot be exercised against debts made preferential either by common law or 
the Bankruptcy Act is possible but does not commend itself. 
45. 27 Ch. D. 478. 
46. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 764 and see Re jones (1885) 31 Ch. D. 440. 
47. In re Samson [1906] 2 Ch. 584. 
48. [1914] 2 Ch. 395. 
49. [1932] A.C. 365. See at pp. 372-3. 
50. [1905] 1 Ch. 697. 
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Here the assets of the estate are ultimately sufficient to pay all debts but the question 
is in what order the assets should be applied. to pay whatever debts exist. If the estate is in 
an insolvent condition then such question can only arise if for some reason or other the creditors 
refrain from pursuing their claims against all· the assets or are debarred for technical reasons 
from so pursuing them. 
Queensland, unlike in this respect New South ·wales, Victoria and Tasmania, has not 
adopted the statutory order of application set out in the second part of the First Schedule 
to the English Administration of Estates Act 1925. This is not an unmixed disadvantage as 
the statutory order seems to have created as many problems as it has solved. The position 
in Queensland is that the old order evolved by the Court of Chancery applies. By virtue of 
this order the assets are to be applied in the following order, to wit:-
(a) Residuary personalty, that is personalty not specifically bequeathed, but 
retaining thereout a fund sufficient to meet pecuniary legacies. 
(b) Realty devised in trust to pay debts. 
(c) Realty vesting in the administrator, that is to say undisposed of. 
(d) Realty charged with the payment of debts. 
(e) The fund retained to meet pecuniary legacies. 
(f) Realty devised either specifically or by general description and personalty 
specifically bequeathed-these classes abate pro rata and pari passu as between 
themselves. 
(g) Property appointed by will in exercise of a general power of appointment. 
As to this order certain remarks must be made. 
(l) The order depends partly on the distinction between realty and personalty but 
also, so far as concerns the differentiation bet:ween classes of personalty, on the way in which 
personalty is dealt with by the will. Thus if the testator has a certain quantity of jewellery 
and disposes of it by express mention, then it is the subject of a specific legacy and abates 
only in the sixth class. If it is not mentioned it forms part of the general mass of residue 
and forms part of the first fund to be resorted to. 
(2) The several assets comprised in each class as between themselves abate rateably 
according to value, but the whole of the assets comprised in one class must be exhausted before 
the next class is resorted to. 
(3) The testator can vary the order by intention to this effect expressed or implicit 
in the will. Whether a particular turn of phrase indicates an intention to overturn 
the equitable order may be a difficult question of interpretation. The position is of course 
quite different from that governing the priority of debts inter se as this is beyond the control 
of the testator. 
(4) Undisposed of personalty does not form a separate class. Personalty of course 
may be undisposed of because of the lack of a residuary disposition, but the situation may 
also arise where there has been a residuary gift but one or more of the named beneficiaries 
has died before the death of the testator. In such cases the assets undisposed of abate 
rateably with the residuary personalty. This is the rule in Trethewy v. Helyar,51 which was 
removed in England by the Administration of Estates Act but which still remains in this State. 
Its rationale has been stated to be that until debts have been paid there can be no ascertainment 
of residue. It should of course be remembered that if a person entitled to a specific legacy 
predeceases the testator the property is caught by the gift of residue if there be one. 
(5) Realty is preferentially treated. This appears in various ways. In the first place , 
all residuary devises of realty are treated as specific and abate only in the sixth class. Thus 
a general devise of "all the rest and residue of my estate" places Blackacre, which forms part 
51. (1876) 4 Ch. D. 53. 
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of such residue, on a parity with Whiteacre even though the latter is specifically devised to A. 
In the second place realty undisposed of is not in the first class to be resorted as is the position 
with undisposed of personalty. It is not treated as being on a parity with residuary realty 
but nevertheless constitutes only the third fund to which resort is to be made. Lastly-and 
here we contact a very important rule-although the principle is that the testator can vary 
the order at his pleasure, yet a mere direction to pay debts out of realty or charging debts 
on realty does not do more than place the realty in the second or fourth class according to 
the nature of the direction. This was exemplified by the decision in Re Smith52 where the 
testator possessed inter alia certain real and personal estate in Argentina and certain residuary 
personalty in England. In spite of the fact that he had directed payment of debts out of the 
Argentinian property, the English residuary personalty was still, as between it and_ the 
Argentinian realty, the primary fund to which resort must be made. In order to make 
realty the true ,and primary fund to be first resorted to, or.e must not only onerate the realty 
but "exonerate the personalty," that is to say use words which indicate an intent that the 
residuary personalty is not to be resorted to save as a secondary or auxiliary fund. The 
Courts are very ready to infer a charge of debts on realty53 on account of the old rule that in 
most cases realty escaped liability altogether, but such charge takes the matter only part of 
the journey. An intermediate position may be reached where the testator makes his realty 
and personalty available as a mixed fund for the express purpose of paying debts, for instance 
where the will contains a direction to sell all the testator's real and personal estate followed 
by a direction to pay debts.54 Here the proceeds of the realty do not constitute a primary 
fund but are added to the proceeds of the personalty to constitute one fund. The whole fund 
' is treated on the basis of being personalty55 out of which debts are paid rateably. 
No such rule of exemption applies in favour of expressly onerated personalty. If there 
is a direction that debts be paid out of a specified fund of personalty that fund is to be 
exhausted before residuary personalty is looked to. · In Re Smith56 the direction was to pay 
debts out of the Argentinian property which included both realty and personalty. In so far 
as such property comprised personalty, such personalty was resorted to before the residuary 
personalty in England was touched. However there is authority that in such a case the rule 
in Trethewy v. Helyar57 is not applied, so that if there exists the specially indicated fund of 
personalty and some of the residuary personalty becomes undisposed of by reason of lapse, 
then such lapsed share becomes a primary fund and is applied before either the specially 
indicated fund or the general personalty is attacked. 58 The reason is that the exoneration 
of the general personalty is not taken to be intended to benefit the next of kiri. 
(6) The general order of application does not bind creditors, who are free to resort to 
whatever fund they please. In fact, unless the whole estate was being administered by the 
Court, it would only be by chance that a creditor resorted to assets in their correct order. 
Moreover the executor may make a payment in ignorance of the existence of other assets 
which should have been applied to such payment. When a creditor has disturbed the order 
by resorting directly to one of the more favoured class of assets or owing to the action of the 
executor the order has not been observed, the rights of the beneficiaries are adjusted by the 
process of marshalling. The beneficiary whose assets stand in a highe:J," degree of protection 
but have nevertheless been wasted by the action of the creditor, can claim that his loss be 
made good out of one of the less favoured funds. The specific legatee whose asset has been 
seized by a creditor can for instance marshal against the general residuary legatee or the 
devisee who takes realty charged with the payment of debts. The right of marshalling is an 
equitable right enforceable either as an incident in the administration of the estate by the 
52. [1913] 2 Ch. 216. 
53. A general direction to pay debts is enough. See e.g. Re Byrne's Will [1938] St. R. Qd. 346. 
54. Roberts v. Walker (1830) I Russ & My. 752, 39 E.R. 288. 
55. Bellairs v. Bellairs (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. at 516-517. 
56. Supra. 
57. Supra. 
58. Kiljord v. Blaney (1885) 31 Ch. D. 56. 
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Court or by individual process of an equitable nature against the other beneficiary. What 
is here worthy of note is that apparently the right of marshalling can be enforced against 
assets which are neither legal nor equitable and as to which the person entitled stands outside 
the ordinary legal and equitable principles regarding priority of debts. Thus in England in 
the days when (apart from the case of a charge of debts or a trust to pay debts) realty was 
liable only to creditors who held specialties- in which the heir was bound, the devisee was 
entitled to marshal against the heir at law in a case where creditors had taken successful 
action against him the devisee, 59 though neither realty descending to the heir at law nor realty 
devised was either legal or equitable assets. Evidently equity regards the matter as sufficiently 
appertaining to conscience to warrant its intervention. In Queensland the only case in which 
an ordinary devisee would be liable to have assets marshalled against him would be the case 
where the creditor had compelled payment out of a fund which the testator had disposed of 
under a general power of appointment. It is thought that the hands of equity would not 
be tied in such a case. 
(7) The executor in applying residuary personalty to meet debts must first set aside 
a fund sufficient to meet pecuniary legacies. This fund will then be resorted to as a fifth 
class if the residuary personalty and the three intermediate classes of realty (if any exist) 
are not enough to meet the debts. For this purpose, a demonstrative legacy, for instance a 
gift of "£500 of my Commonwealth Inscribed Stock," ranks as a general pecuniary legacy. 
(8) A special position previously existed, and in Queensland still to some extent exists, 
in relation to real estate which is subject to a specific security such as a mortage. Under 
the old law the heir at law or devisee to whom a mortaged estate descended or was devised 
could claim that a debt secured on that property by mortgage or charge inter vivos should 
be paid first out of the residuary personalty, and apparently this was so even though the 
testator had directed debts to be paid out of his real estate; as even in the latter case the 
realty was merely constituted an auxiliary fund. This position in England was altered by 
Locke King's Act which in Queensland is represented by the Equity Act 1867, s. 78. This 
provides that, in the absence of a contrary intention, the heir or devisee shall not be entitled 
to have the mortgage debt discharged out of the personal estate or other real estate but the 
land charged shall as between the different persons claiming through the deceased be primarily 
liable to the payment of mortgage debts with which the same is charged. This provision 
corresponds to the original English provision under which it was held that a general direction 
to pay debts whether out of residuary personalty or some other fund was su:fficient indication 
of a_ "contrary intention" within the meaning of the statute to exonerate the realty.60 A 
later English enactment, 30 & 31 Viet. c. 69, removed this interpretation but was not copied 
in Queensland so that in this State it is still the law that a general direction to pay debts 
leaves the residuary personalty saddled with mortgage debts and other secured liabilities. 61 
Locke King's Act does not apply to pure personalty so that a specific legatee of a personal 
chattel which is mortgaged is still entitled to have the mortgage debt redeemed out of the 
general personalty.62 In England the Act was extended to apply to leaseholds but this is 
not so in Queensland. 
59. See Chaplin v. Chaplin (1735) 3 P. Wms. 365 at p. 367, 24 E.R. at p. 1104 (see also reporter's note at 
p. 1105); Powis v. Corbet (1747) 3 Atk. 556, 26 E.R. 1120. 
60. Stone v. Parker (1860) 1 Dr. & Sm. 212, 62 E.R. 359; Watt v. Caldwell (1900) 21 N.S.W. L.R. (E) 93. 
61. See Queensland Trustees Ltd. v. Finney [1905] St. R. Qd. 98. 
62. Bothamley v. Sherson (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 304 . 
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